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For months, the legal profession indulged eager (or dread) anticipa-
tory gossip about what was rumored to be the first systematic breach of
Supreme Court secrecy. With the publication of The Brethren,' chock-
full of jurisprudential anecdotage, authors Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong indeed appeared to have leaped into the breach. But no
sooner did the book surface than the vast majority of the bar con-
demned it. What was not initially clear was whether the objection was
that Woodward and Armstrong had gotten it wrong-that Supreme
Court decisions are not the end-result of a political process of wheeling
and dealing and bargaining and bickering-or, worse, that they had
gotten it right and revealed the dirty little secret that the profession
had successfully kept from laymen for all these years.
The public, on the other hand, bought hundreds of thousands of
copies and kept the book atop the bestseller list for months.
Why the disjunction?
I. The Critical Attack
When a book's distinctive contribution purports to be its insider-
perspective, informed by advanced (albeit mysterious) investigative-re-
porting techniques, credibility would seem to be essential to success.
The early reviewers of The Brethren, however, blew the whistle on its
pretensions to accuracy. In her New York Times Book Review critique,
Renata Adler compiled a litany of misstatements, incongruities, and
legal errors that riddled the book.2 Writing in The Washington Post
Book World, Professor Walter F. Murphy presented a similar catalog
of mistakes.3 Although Murphy conceded that the abundance of errors
t Editor, THE NATION. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1954; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1959.
1. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME CouRT (1979)
[hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. Adler, The Justices and the Journalists, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 7 (Book Re-
view), at 1, 24.
3. Murphy, Spilling the Secrets of the Supreme Court, Wash. Post Book World, Dec.
16, 1979, at 1.
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does not undermine the authors' central theses (that is, the villainy of
the Chief Justice, the location of power at the Court's center, and the
importance of decisional negotiation),4 he observed that the errors "cast
some doubt" upon the reliability of unverifiable assertions. 5
A particularly severe critique came from New York Times columnist
Anthony Lewis, who did some investigative reporting of his own.0
Lewis focused on the most shocking-if true-revelation in The
Brethren: that Justice Brennan voted to affirm the murder conviction
of "Slick" Moore7 in order to curry the favor of Justice Blackmun in
other pending cases.8 In other words, the authors in effect charge that
Justice Brennan was willing to trade a man's constitutional rights for
the good will of a fellow Justice.
On the surface, the accusation seems credible. "Marshall needed only
one more [vote] to take away Blackmun's majority. His friend Brennan
would surely provide the fifth vote. Brennan, after all, was the author
of a landmark 1963 decision (Brady v. Maryland) that required prosecu-
tors to turn over all exculpatory evidence to the defense."9
After noting several critical errors in those portions of the account
that involved public information,10 Lewis sought to discover or dis-
credit the authors' anonymous source. The passage in question pur-
ported to rely upon a conversation between Justice Brennan and an
anonymous law clerk of his.'1 Lewis identified that clerk as Paul
Hoeber, now Acting Professor of Law at the University of California
at Berkeley.12
Hoeber categorically denied that he or Justice Brennan had made
the remarks attributed to them by Woodward and Armstrong. Accord-
ing to Lewis, Hoeber contacted the three other Brennan clerks from
the 1971 Term; all agreed that they had had no such conversation with
4. Id. at 10.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Lewis, Supreme Court Confidential, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Feb. 7, 1980, at 3.
7. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
8. P. 225.
9. Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
10. Lewis noted that Justice Douglas, not Justice Brennan, had written the Brady
opinion. Lewis, supra note 6, at 3. Moreover, contrary to Woodward and Armstrong's
assertion, Brady had not required the prosecutor to turn over all exculpatory evidence
to the defendant; rather, the Court had held that "'[t]he suppression by the prosecution
of evidence . . . is material either to guilt or to punishment.'" Id. (quoting Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87). The issues in the Moore case "were precisely whether there had
been an adequate defense 'request' for certain evidence and whether the evidence was
'material'-whether, that is, it would have made any difference. The two Supreme Court
opinions [Blackmun's and Marshall's] differed on the facts of the latter question." Id.
11. P. 225.
12. Lewis, supra note 6, at 3.
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the Justice. The Brennan clerks then contacted twenty-nine of the
remaining thirty clerks of that Term; none confirmed the report, and
none knew of any clerk "shocked" or "shaken" by Brennan's attitude
in the case. Hoeber contended, moreover, that Woodward and Arm-
strong exaggerated the importance attributed to Moore; it was decided
on the frantic last day of the Term, along with a number of momentous
opinions, among which Moore was a "pebble on the beach."'13
Lewis's research, of course, is no more conclusive than Woodward
and Armstrong's unsupported assertion. Any clerk disloyal enough to
breach Justice Brennan's confidence in the first place presumably
would be devious enough to lie to his fellow clerks or to Lewis in the
second place. Justice Brennan, moreover, has not commented publicly.
Finally, the fact that several "more important" cases were handed down
along with Moore cuts both ways: if neither Justice Brennan nor his
clerks was focusing on Moore, then perhaps, as Woodward and Arm-
strong claim, the Justice used that "pebble" to construct a sturdier
alliance on other matters. My own guess is that the Blackmun factor
was one among many variables that Justice Brennan took into account,
consciously or unconsciously, in determining Slick Moore's fate.
Lewis's essay is important, not for the accuracy of its account, but
because it represents another instance of a legal sophisticate, in a
prestigious forum, undermining quite spectacularly the accuracy of a
Woodward and Armstrong account. Presumably critiques such as Ad-
ler's, Murphy's, and Lewis's have a multiplier effect: if the verifiable
portions of The Brethren are so vulnerable, how can we trust the vast
majority of the accounts, which are unverifiable?
Critics have faulted The Brethren for more than just inaccuracy. On
occasion, Woodward and Armstrong invade privacy in ways unrelated
to any legitimate literary or social purpose. For example, they report
that, near the end of his tenure, Justice Douglas was incontinent: "the
unpleasant odor filled the room."'14 That item says more about the
sensibilities of the authors' sources than about the authors' capacity for
mobilizing the relevant detail.
A more controversial invasion of privacy is the account of Justice
Stewart's self-removal from the ranks of Chief Justice Warren's possible
successors. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Justice Stewart
justified his withdrawal to President Nixon on the ground that eleva-
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yet Justice Stewart's true motive was purportedly to prevent public
disclosure of his wife's drinking problem. 15
This incident, like many others in the book, turns on questions of
fact; when the rumor first surfaced, Justice Stewart wrote to Newsweek
to point out that his wife had been on the wagon for eight years. 16
Even if the account is accurate, though, should it have appeared? As
Aryeh Neier recently observed in The Nation, the customary justifica-
tion for such intrusions on privacy-that they are the price that public
figures pay for seeking the limelight-is inapplicable here. "If Wood-
ward and Armstrong are accurate . .. Stewart gave up a more promi-
nent spot in the public eye in order to preserve this bit of privacy."' 7
What standard governed the authors' decisions as to what to reveal?
"As best I can tell," Neier concluded, "they were guided by the fact
that the information had not been disclosed previously. Another way of
saying this is that they had no standard."' 8
II. The Popular Response
"Nonlawyers," predicted an early lawyer-reviewer of The Brethren,
"will find the book extremely hard to read."' 9 In fact, she wrote, it
might well be retitled "Woodward k Armstrong, Cases and Materials
on the Supreme Court."20 There seemed to be good cause for what
amounted to a dire sales projection. The Brethren's structure has no
built-in tension. The book is boringly organized term-by-term from
1969 (when Burger became Chief Justice) to 1975 (an arbitrary cutoff
date), with no criteria set forth to explain the selection of cases dis-
cussed. Contrary to advance hype, the book contains little personal
gossip; for example, what Justice X's first wife thought of Justice Y's
latest wife, which Justices were in therapy, who was sleeping with
whom. The book does not seriously attempt to profile either the Jus-
tices or their jurisprudence, beyond the sketchiest of thumbnail sketches
and conclusory characterization of Justices as liberal or conservative.
The authors make no effort to trace the trend of decisions over time,
presenting the manner in which the Burger Court has whittled away at
15. Pp. 16-17.
16. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 1979, at 7.
17. Neier, The Brethren: A Symposium, THE NATION, Feb. 2, 1980, at 118. Neier, in
fact, hesitated to repeat the story about Mrs. Stewart. His doubts were resolved when he
noticed that THE BRETHREN had become the number one national best-seller. The damage
to the Stewarts' privacy had already been done.
18. Id.
19. Adler, supra note 2, at 24.
20. Id.
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the decisions of the Warren Court.
Yet no sooner did The Brethren appear on the shelves than it zoomed
to the top of the bestseller lists. Within two months of publication, its
publisher had printed 600,000 copies and predicted that the book
would outsell even Woodward's Watergate works, 21 The Final Days22
and All the President's Men.2 3
The phenomenon of unfavorable reviews followed by record-break-
ing sales is not uncommon in the world of escapist fiction. Yet The
Brethren's sole claim to distinctiveness is thought to be its cornucopia
of new jurisprudential fact. Why has the public embraced so vulnerable
a study so eagerly?
Gossip alone cannot be the answer. It is not that the book lacks gossip;
Woodward and Armstrong have managed to collect numerous poison
portraits of the Justices by their brethren. But even the indiscreet intra-
judicial gossip is not very sensational; rather, it might be called "pro-
cess-gossip"-that is, rumor that has as much to do with the bureaucracy,
strategy, and politics of the opinion-writing process as it does with the
personalities involved. This material is The Brethren's center and is
both its most valuable and its most troubling aspect.
The advance hype, and Woodward's fame as a chronicler of Water-
gate, guaranteed visibility, but not the blockbuster status that The
Brethren has achieved. Nor can one attribute the book's popularity to
its unique penetration of the Court's deliberative process, for that pene-
tration is not in fact unique. Others have looked behind the printed
opinions to explain the politics of judicial negotiation.2 4 Yet despite
such literature, and despite the decades-old insights of the Legal Real-
ists, the backstage matter of opinion negotiation is still ignored in most
constitutional law courses and invisible in high school civics texts.
Although the pettiness, the intrigues, the raw nature of the inter-
action between the Justices may be tediously familiar to those schooled
in the scholarly literature, little of that information has filtered out
beyond the bar. Can it be that much of the popularity of The Brethren
is attributable to the failure of legal scholars to reveal to the public
that which they have known all along: that Justices bicker and deal and
hate to pull the switch; that often there is no right legal answer? Should
21. TIME, March 10, 1980, at 48.
22. B. WooDWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS (1976).
23. B. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
24. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE
SUPREME COURT AT WORK (1957); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); A. MASON, HARLAN
FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw (1956); W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1964); F. RODELL, NINE MEN (1955).
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we really be surprised at the national suspicious curiosity about nine
men in black robes who preside over a fundamental federal institution
that has the last word on so many aspects of our lives?
In some respects, the authors' method undermines their message.
Their scholarly utility and ultimately their credibility have been
weakened by the same literary artifice that has broadened their audi-
ence, namely, the technique of, not merely protecting, but ignoring the
source, of reporting as-told-to's as fact, and of saving the reader the
drudgery of weighing conflicting versions of the same episode. Pre-
sumably, the authors have heard the conflicting versions, winnowed and
sifted, and presented us with the one that they believe to be true; hence
the omniscient narrative voice, the graduation of rumor into fact. The
disinclination to provide even such clues as "according to two former
clerks" or "one of Justice X's male clerks charged" diminishes the
possibility of judging a source's veracity, prejudice, or perspective. The
authors venture to the more distant shores of the New Journalism when
they enter the minds of Justices (some of whom refused to be inter-
viewed) and tell us how they felt.
Although such techniques keep the reader in the evidentiary dark
and contribute to the mystique of the investigative journalist, they
also function to demystify the Court. The fast-paced narrative, the
authoritative voice, and the ability to penetrate the minds and hearts
of their characters lend the narrative the appeal of ultimate insiderism-
a tour through one of the few institutions in our society that is licensed
to transform American policy yet that has managed largely to maintain
its myth of impartiality. The Court, The Brethren tells the reader, is
what he suspected it was after all: a political institution. This "insight"
accommodates the prejudices of the know-nothings while confirming
the orientation of more sophisticated laymen who distrust the above-
the-battle image of the Court frequently reflected in the media.
The distortion in this apparent glimpse at men of power exercising
power stems from the journalist's mistaken notion that anything that
is secret is significant. The secrecy surrounding the Court's delibera-
tions may make specific revelations about particular decisions "news," 25
but it does not make such material significant in understanding the
truth about how the Court makes up its collective mind.
Some critics have objected that The Brethren presents a clerk's-eye
view of the Court.2 6 The reader, however, should have little difficulty
25. Woodward and Armstrong have unearthed interesting information, for example,
on recent capital punishment decisions, pp. 205-20, and abortion decisions, pp. 165-72.
26. E.g., Murphy, supra note 3, at 11.
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figuring that out for himself, given the authors' near-obsession with
the clerks. 27 There would be no harm in presenting the clerks' perspec-
tive if it were identified as such. The clerks may have as good a perspec-
tive as anyone on such elements of adjudication as revision of opinions.
The real question is, what has been left out? The reliance upon clerks'
recollections of the draft revisions provides the reader with little sense
of how these negotiations rank in importance as compared to briefs,
oral argument, jurisprudential perspective, the trend of cases over time,
the political climate, and, as they used to say, what the Justice ate for
breakfast.
Conclusion
There is value in recycling the Legal Realist thesis in terms that a
new generation can understand and in focusing on a negotiating pro-
cess that is too often ignored in formal legal curricula and analyses. To
the extent that the case histories are true, The Brethren represents a
fantastic piece of reporting. If we treat Woodward and Armstrong's
factual assertions as hypotheses to be tested, they offer valuable data
for future historical evaluation. But because the authors have chosen
to present their conclusions as narrative assertions, without allowing
the reader to view the reasoning process that preceded them, reading
this book is almost as unsatisfactory as reading a per curiam opinion.
Because the Court's negotiations are abstracted from any historical
context, Woodward and Armstrong seem to imply that, since behind-
the-scenes bargaining, linguistic compromise, and vote-trading are at
odds with the Court's image, they are wrong.
Ironically, the main contribution of The Brethren is at odds with
this implication. If the book has any value beyond its specific "fac-
toids," 28 it is to bring lay and professional images of the Court into
closer congruence with each other. Such an enterprise would seem to
be a precondition for any serious attempt to evaluate the way in which
the Court makes up its mind and its impact on our society.
That said, it should be noted that nothing in this book is so shocking
27. Woodward and Armstrong use the Justices' attitudes toward clerks, for example,
almost as a litmus test of judicial character. The authors claim that Justice Douglas had
no faith in Justice Brennan's willingness to fight for principle because Justice Brennan
had once fired a radical clerk under pressure from conservatives. P. 77.
28. See N. MAILER, MARILYN 18 (1973). Mailer coined the term "factoid" to deal with
the difficulty of distinguishing facts from fiction in rumors about Marilyn Monroe.
Factoids, he wrote, are "facts which have no existence before appearing in a magazine or
newspaper, creations which are not so much lies as a product to manipulate emotion in
the Silent Majority." Id.
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as what may have been its most tangible impact on the Court itself.
Two months after The Brethren was published, the Court announced
its decision in the case of Frank Snepp, author of an unauthorized book
on the CIA.29 Without even considering oral or written arguments in
his behalf, the Court deprived Snepp of at least colorable First Amend-
ment rights in an opinion that, according to one critic, manifested "con-
tempt for the rule of law."30 We cannot know what Woodward and
Armstrong so often pretend to know-how the Court made up its mind.
But is it implausible that The Brethren's disclosure of the Court's
secrets explains the language in Snepp permitting government agencies
to punish current or former employees who leak information to the
press? Have the Justices sent a signal to their clerks that the first
Brethren will be the last?
29. Snepp v. United States, 48 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1980) (Nos. 78-1871, 79-265).
30. Lewis, A Lawless Decision, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1980, at A23, col. 1.
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